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Unsealing Settlements: Recent Efforts To Expose Settlement
Agreements That Conceal Public Hazards
In January 2002, the Boston Globe horrified the nation when it
reported that 130 people had revealed Father John J. Geoghan of the
Boston Archdiocese had sexually abused them as children., Plaintiffs had
filed more than eighty civil claims alleging sexual abuse by Geoghan.2
Fifty more parishioners had previously settled claims of sexual molestation
by the priest.' In spite of the numerous accusations of abuse, court-ordered
confidentiality agreements prevented their disclosure to the public.4 As
follow-up stories were published, readers learned that the Archdiocese had
settled claims involving at least seventy other priests.5 The few public
cases, such as Geoghan's, were but a small percentage of the private
agreements that the church had reached over the preceding years with
abuse victims of priests.6 Meanwhile, allegedly predatory priests were
permitted to continue their work in communities that did not know of the
settlements.7 The scope of the abuse was made apparent when over five
hundred people signed on to an $85 million settlement with the Boston
1. Matt Carroll et al., Church Allowed Abuse by Priest for Years Aware of Geoghan
Record: Archdiocese Still Shuttled Him from Parish to Parish, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 6, 2002, at
Al; see also The Boston Globe: Spotlight Investigation: Abuse in the Catholic Church, at
http://www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/abuse (last visited Sept. 1, 2004) (compiling the Globe's
Pulitzer Prize-winning reporting on the Catholic abuse scandal and its aftermath) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
2. Carroll et al., supra note 1.
3. Id.
4. Id. ("But for all Geoghan's notoriety, the public record [of the abuse] is remarkably
skeletal .... because almost all the evidence in the lawsuits about the church's supervision of
Geoghan has been under a court-ordered confidentiality seal granted to church lawyers."). A
Massachusetts judge ordered the records opened in November 2001 based on the Globe's
intervention in the civil suits. See Leary v. Geoghan, No. 99-0371, 2001 WL 1902393 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Nov. 26, 2001) (setting aside the impoundment order on discovery materials issued in
the civil claims against Geoghan).
5. Carroll et al., Scores of Priests Involved in Sex Abuse Cases: Settlements Kept Scope of
Issue Out of Public Eye, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 31, 2002, at Al. "[Piublic cases [about twenty-five
at the time the article was published] represent just a fraction of the priests whose cases have been
disposed of in private negotiations that never brought the parties near a courthouse, according to
interviews with many of the attorneys involved." Id.
6. Id.
7. See supra note 1 (discussing Father John Geoghan); Carroll, supra note 5 (discussing
Fathers Robert M. Burns and Jay M. Mullin). However, according to the Globe, most of the
abusive priests were removed from parish service. See Carroll, supra note 5 ("[The vast majority
[of priests accused of abuse] have been effectively removed from parish service, and many of
them are living unsupervised in local communities, among neighbors who know nothing about
their past problems, or whether they might still pose a danger to children.").
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Archdiocese.8
Twelve years before the Globe exposed the abuse scandal, Florida
enacted a law to address hazards to the public hidden in settlement
agreements9 like those between the Boston Archdiocese and sexual abuse
victims. Florida initiated a radical change in state approaches to dispute
settlement when it passed the Sunshine in Litigation Act, ° the first statute"
to declare settlement agreements concealing potential public health and
safety hazards void as a matter of public policy. 2 Since the passage of
Florida's statute, other states have adopted laws addressing secret
settlements and public dangers. Nearly twenty states now have laws
affecting settlement confidentiality in varying forms and degrees. 3 The
8. See Erica Noonan & Kellyanne Mahoney, For Local Parishes, A Reckoning, BOSTON
GLOBE, Feb. 15, 2004, at Al (stating that "the Catholic bishops of the United States have
removed about 700 allegedly abusive priests and deacons from ministry over the last two years, a
dramatic housecleaning at the end of a half-century in which 4,392 priests allegedly abused
10,667 minors"); see also Michael Paulson, Church Hierarchy Faulted by Lay Panel on Abuse:
700 Priests Removed by Bishops in 2 Years, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 28, 2004, at Al.
9. Sunshine in Litigation Act, 1990 Fla. Laws ch. 90-20, § I (effective July 1, 1990)
(codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081).
10. Id.
11. Florida passed its Sunshine in Litigation Act in 1990. Id. Louisiana followed with an
amendment to its Code of Civil Procedure in 1995. See Act of June 9, 1995, 1995 La. Acts 49
(codified at LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1426(D) (West Supp. 2004)).
12. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(4) (West Supp. 2004).
13. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-122(a) (2003) (prohibiting contracts or agreements that
restrict anyone's right to disclose an environmental hazard); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-21.5-3.5-18
(Michie 2003) (providing that statements submitted to settlement mediator are not public
documents unless the parties agree otherwise); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.878 (Michie 2003)
(exempting from public inspection except by court order personal information, scientific research,
confidential or proprietary information disclosed to agencies, and other records); LA. CODE CIV.
PROC. ANN. art. 1426(D) (West Supp. 2004) (declaring any agreement or contract that conceals a
public hazard void and unenforceable); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-1.3 (2003) (presuming open for
public inspection all settlement documents in any suit, administrative proceeding, or arbitration
against any state government agency or subdivision); MASS. R. CT., Trial Ct. R., § VIII Unif. R.
on Impoundment P., Rules 1, 8 (Thompson-West 2004) (allowing the court to grant some people
access to sealed materials); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2912h (2003) (making medical
malpractice settlements confidential and exempting such records from state Freedom of
Information Act disclosure); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.0375 (Michie 2003) (barring
settlements with state government, employees, or legislators that require confidentiality in any
terms and declaring such agreements void); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 216.1(a)
(2004) (directing the court to consider interests of the public and the parties in sealing court
records); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.402(l)-(2) (1997) (barring public bodies, officers, or agents from
entering settlement agreements conditioned on confidentiality); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.0-20.01(A)
(2003) (providing the procedure by which an attorney can share information under protective
order with another attorney in a similar or related matter); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4.24.611(4)(b) (West 2004) (providing that confidentiality provisions may only be entered,
ordered, or enforced if the court finds the provision is in the public interest); ARIZ. R. Civ. P.
26(c)(2) (providing that the court may consider possible risks to public health, safety, or financial
welfare in determining whether to issue a protective order over discovery materials); CAL. RULES
OF COURT R. 243.1(c)-(d) (2004) (prohibiting sealing court records unless the court finds the
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trend toward addressing hidden dangers in litigation documents continues.
Most recently, single chambers of both the Georgia 4 and Illinois 15
legislatures have approved Sunshine in Litigation Acts during their 2003-
2004 sessions. As consideration and passage of settlement disclosure laws
in state legislatures across the country illustrate,16 a movement is afoot to
limit settlements that conceal dangers to the public.
This Recent Development will consider some states' approaches to
disclosing secret settlement agreements and argue that North Carolina and
other states considering limitations on protective orders that conceal public
hazards should adopt policies similar to Florida's, declaring such private
settlements void as a matter of public policy. First, this Recent
Development will briefly describe the terms of Florida's and Georgia's
Sunshine in Litigation Acts. Second, it will focus on the policies driving
states to enact Sunshine laws. Third, counterarguments to these animating
policy goals will be considered. Fourth, this Recent Development will
contemplate the potential impacts of the policies and specific terms of
Florida's and Georgia's Sunshine acts. Finally, it will discuss North
Carolina's current and proposed rules regarding settlement secrecy.
Regarded as one of the most sweeping Sunshine in Litigation Acts, 17
interest against openness would be substantially prejudiced by disclosure); DEL. SUPER. CT. CIV.
R. 5(g)(1) to (2) (2003) (providing that court records are only sealed upon good cause and subject
to discretionary in camera review); GA. R. CT. ANN., Unif. R. for the Super. Ct. 21, 21.2
(LexisNexis Publishing 2004) (requiring that courts find harm to privacy outweighing the public
interest to limit access to court files); IDAHO APP. R. 49(b) (2003) (deeming settlement
conferences and all associated documents to be confidential and ordering the judge to destroy
documents if the parties fail to settle); S.C. R. Civ. P. 41.1(a), (c) (2004) (prohibiting settlement
agreements filed before the court from being conditioned on secrecy, but specifically disclaiming
applicability to private settlement agreements); TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a (presuming court records to
be open, including settlement agreements not filed with the court). The federal government has
also considered Sunshine in Litigation Acts. Though prior attempts failed, the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary recently considered the Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2003. See S. 817, 108th
Cong. (2003). That bill would amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26(c) regarding
protective orders. Id.
14. See H.B. 1019, 147th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2003), http://www.legis.state.ga.us/
legis/2003_04/versions/hbl019 LC_29_1019_a_2.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review). The bill was referred to the House Judiciary Committee on April 25, 2003. Georgia
General Assembly, available at http://www.legis.state.ga.us/ legis/2003_04/sum/hblO19.htm (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review).
15. See H.B. 1191, 93rd Gen. Assem. (i1. 2003), available at http://www.legis.state.il.us/
legislation/billstatus-pf.asp?DocNum=I 191 &DocTypelD=HB&LeglD=1753&GAID=3&Session
ID=3&GA=93 (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). The Illinois bill passed on April 2,
2003, and was referred to the Senate Committee on Rules on July 1. See Bill Status of H.B. 1191,
at WL 2003 Bill Tracking IL H.B. 1191.
16. See supra notes 13-15.
17. See Laurie Kratky Dor, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of Confidentiality in
the Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 313, n.118 (1999). However, Dor6
argues that Texas's Rule of Civil Procedure concerning secrecy is broader than Florida's law
2004] 2157
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Florida's statute prohibits a judge from entering any order that intentionally
or incidentally conceals a public hazard 18 or any information related to a
public hazard. 9 The law defines "public hazard" as "an instrumentality,
including but not limited to any device, instrument, person, procedure,
product, or a condition of a device, instrument, person, procedure or
product, that has caused and is likely to cause injury."2 Scant case law
exists interpreting the definition of "public hazard," but the Florida District
Court of Appeal for the Fourth District held that a financing practice that
caused only monetary injury was not a public hazard within the statutory
definition.2' The court interpreted the limited legislative history available
as indicating that the legislature intended to address "tangible danger to
public health or safety. '22 Asbestos 3 and defective car tires24 have been
deemed public hazards.
Florida's law is broad in its scope. The act provides:
Any portion of an agreement or contract which has the purpose or
effect of concealing a public hazard, any information concerning a
public hazard, or any information which may be useful to members
of the public in protecting themselves from injury which may result
from the public hazard, is void, contrary to public policy, and may
because Texas defines "court records" to include unfiled settlement and discovery documents. Id.
at 313; see also TEX. R. CIv. P. 76a(2)(b) to (c) (defining court records as "settlement agreements
not filed of record, excluding all reference to any monetary consideration, that seek to restrict
disclosure of information concerning matters that have a probable adverse effect upon the general
public health or safety" and "discovery, not filed of record, concerning matters that have a
probable adverse effect upon the general public health or safety ... except discovery in cases
originally initiated to preserve bona fide trade secrets or other intangible property rights"). Texas
prohibits sealing such records unless the interest in sealing the record outweighs both the
presumption of openness and any public health hazard, and there is no less restrictive means of
protecting the interest. See TEX. R. Ctv. P. 76a(l) (setting forth the showing required to
overcome the presumption of openness).
18. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(2) (West 2004) (defining public hazard as "an
instrumentality, including but not limited to any device, instrument, person, procedure, product,
or a condition of a device, instrument, person, procedure or product, that has caused and is likely
to cause injury").
19. Id. § 69.081(3) (providing "no court shall enter an order or judgment which as the
purpose or effect of concealing a public hazard or any information concerning a public hazard").
20. Id. § 69.081(2). Under the terms, of Florida's statute, the Catholic priest abuses would
fall within the definition because "public hazard" includes a person who caused or is likely to
cause injury. See id.
21. Stivers v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 777 So. 2d 1023, 1026 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
22. Id.
23. See ACandS, Inc. v. Askew, 597 So. 2d 895, 898-99 (Ha. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (finding
that depositions regarding asbestos were included within the reach of § 69.081).
24. See Jones v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 2003 Fla. App. LEXIS 17101, *18-20 (Fla.
Ct. App. 2003) (vacating a confidentiality order placed on discovery documents concerning a tire
failure because the jury found that the tire had injured the plaintiff).
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not be enforced.
Thus, Florida's Sunshine law limits court-imposed protective orders for
settlement agreements that are presented to Florida courts for approval but
somehow compromise public health and safety. Further, the act reaches
private settlement agreements not presented to the court and nullifies those
agreements that impose confidentiality as a condition of settlement when a
product or procedure has caused or is likely to cause injury.26 However,
Florida's Sunshine law specifically exempts from disclosure trade secrets
unrelated to public hazards." Opponents to disclosure of settlement
agreements may petition the court for closure on a showing of "good
cause" discerned through in camera review.28 Additionally, Florida gives
affected third parties, expressly including the media, standing to contest
protective orders.2 9
Georgia recently introduced its own, more limited version of Sunshine
in Litigation legislation.3° Georgia's pending bill forbids any "settlement
agreement, consent order, or any other dispositive document or order filed
with a court or subject to enforcement by any other document filed with the
court" from including "any provision restricting the disclosure of
information which is relevant to the protection of public health, welfare, or
safety."3 Thus, settlement agreements filed in a Georgia court could not
contain secrecy provisions concerning information related to potential
public health or safety hazards. The Georgia bill also prohibits any "final
disposition of a pending action ... , such as a full and final settlement with
a dismissal with prejudice ...." conditioned on secrecy concerning
information related to potential health and safety threats.32 Further, the bill
forbids any agreement filed with the court from including a condition of
non-disclosure to a relevant state or federal agency, regardless of any
25. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(4) (West Supp. 2004) (emphasis added). Like Florida's
statute, Illinois's pending bill renders void and unenforceable as against public policy any
agreements or contracts (or portions of agreements or contracts) that intend to or incidentally do
conceal public hazards. See H.B. 1191, 93rd Gen. Assem., § 2-1306(C) (111. 2003), available at
http://www.legis.state.il.us/legislation/billstatus-pf.asp?DocNum=l 191 &DocTypelD=HB&LegI
D=1753&GALD=3&SessionlD=3&GA=93 (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
26. Illinois's pending bill equally reaches private agreements. See Ill. H.B. 1191, § 2-
1306(C).
27. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(5) (West Supp. 2004).
28. Id. § 69.081(7).
29. Id. § 69.081(6).
30. See H.B. 1019, 147th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2003), available at http://www.legis.
state.ga.us/legis/200304/versions/hbl019LC291019_a_2.htm (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
31. Id.
32. Id.
2004] 2159
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danger to public health, welfare, or safety.33
The terms of Sunshine laws such as Florida's articulate the impetus
for these statutes: protecting the public from concealed public hazards in
court records or settlement agreements.34 According to the Court of Appeal
of Florida, Fourth District, the legislative history of Florida's law shows
that the Sunshine in Litigation Act was passed primarily to address
products liability claims.35 The court drew its interpretation from a Florida
House report:
Recently, there is a growing concern relating to the practice of
settling cases, especially in the products liability area, where as part
of the settlement the parties will agree not to disclose information
regarding hazardous products, or the court will enter a protective
order precluding such disclosure. Typical of this type of situation is
the Oregon case of Oberg v. Honda Motor Co. where a jury ruled
that Honda manufactured an inherently unsafe three-wheel vehicle,
but the court entered a protective order requiring that all evidentiary
documents obtained from Honda which identified the inherent
manufacturing flaws be returned to the defendants.36
California amplified the motivating force behind Sunshine in
Litigation in its recently considered, but ultimately unsuccessful, bill:
Secrecy agreements and protective orders not reviewed by a court
that prohibit disclosure to the public or public safety agencies of
information that is evidence of defective products or environmental
hazards are injurious to the health, safety, and well-being of all
Californians.
Secrecy agreements can have tragic consequences. A widely
known example of the disastrous consequences of secrecy
agreements is the tragedy resulting from dangerous defects in
Firestone tires, which have reportedly caused more than 150 deaths
and more than 500 injuries worldwide ....
Secrecy agreements allow companies to shield information from
public view and can permit those companies to continue illegal
practices without accountability .... Secrecy agreements allow
companies to shield life-threatening dangers and harmful practices
from public view, thereby severely jeopardizing public welfare and
33. Id.
34. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(3) (West Supp. 2004).
35. See Stivers v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 777 So. 2d 1023, 1025 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
36. Id. (citing Fla. H.R. Comm. on Judiciary, S. 278 (1990), Staff Analysis & Economic
Impact Statement 2 (final Aug. 28 1990)).
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safety.37
Thus, perceived threats to public health based on specific harmful
outcomes resulting from secret settlements have contributed to the
campaign for Sunshine in Litigation laws.38
In states like Florida, a policy of openness in government may also be
driving Sunshine in Litigation Acts. Florida's public records law illustrates
the state's commitment to openness, declaring, "[i]t is the policy of this
state that all state, county, and municipal records shall be open for personal
inspection by any person."39  One Florida District Court of Appeal has
opined, "Florida has a strong public policy in favor of open government.
That policy has received clear recognition in both the legislature and the
courts.""' However, even where states have not declared policies for
openness, advocates for Sunshine in Litigation legislation argue that courts
are public institutions, funded by taxpayer dollars, to which the public is
entitled access.4 1 These declared or perceived rights of access contribute to
the campaign for Sunshine in Litigation.
Finally, some lawyers support Sunshine in Litigation laws as a means
to alleviate ethical dilemmas faced by plaintiffs' advocates.42 The Model
37. S. 11, 2001 Sess., §§ l(a) to (d) (Calif. 2000), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/
pub/01-02/bill/sen/sb_0001-0050/sb_11_bill_20010910_amended asm.pdf (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review). Senate Bill 11 passed Senate Committee, Senate Floor, and
Assembly Committee votes before it was placed under inactive status by an assembly member.
See Complete Bill History, at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/01-02/bill/sen/sb_0001-0050/
sb 11_bill_20021130_jhistory.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review). The record noted that "[opponents vociferously contend that this bill would lead
to increased litigation, more costly litigation, and the likely loss of protection for intellectual and
other property rights." Bill Analysis, at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/01-02/bill/sen/sb_0001-
0050/sb 11_cfa 20010913 170449_sen floor.html, at 13 (last visited Aug. 26, 2004) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
38. See generally James E. Rooks, Jr., Let the Sun Shine In, TRIAL 18, 18 (June 2003)
(illustrating that the position of Sunshine advocates has some foundation in specific cases
allegedly involving secret settlements, such as sexual abuse by priests, Firestone tires, and some
baby products); see also Susan P. Koniak, Are Agreements to Keep Secret Information Learned in
Discovery Legal, Illegal, or Something in Between?, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 783, 783-85 (2002)
(discussing the Firestone tire shredding settlements); Richard A. Zitrin, The Case Against Secret
Settlements (Or, What You Don't Know Can Hurt You), 2 J. INST. STUD. LEGAL ETHICS 115,
119-21 (1999) (describing secret settlements concerning dangers from the drug Zomax, the sleep
aid Halcion, the Dalkon shield contraceptive device, the Shiley heart valve, and General Motors
side-mounted gas tanks).
39. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 119.01 (West Supp. 2004).
40. Salvador v. Fennelly, 593 So. 2d 1091, 1094 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
41. See Zitrin, supra note 38, at 119; Andrew D. Miller, Comment, Federal Antisecrecy
Legislation: A Model Act to Safeguard the Public from Court Sanctioned Hidden Hazards, 20
B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 371, 379. But see Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S.
555, 581 n.18 (1980) (concluding that the public had a First Amendment right of access to a
criminal trial, but the right was qualified, not absolute).
42. Zitrin, supra note 38, at 115; Miller, supra note 41, at 380; Diana Digges, Confidential
2004] 2161
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Rules of Professional Conduct mandate that lawyers follow clients' wishes
regarding settlement.43 When a company offers an attractive settlement to a
plaintiff's attorney that conditions the settlement on concealing a public
hazard, the lawyer is bound to accept the settlement if the client so
chooses.' The attorney owes no duty to the public who may be harmed by
the company's product later. A statute that prohibits secret settlement
agreements where there is a risk of public harm would effectively bar
lawyers from accepting such settlements on behalf of their clients because a
court could open and void such agreements. Making these settlements
illegal would force lawyers to consider the interests of the public when
considering settlement, thus furthering the safety goals that Sunshine laws
address,4" albeit at the expense of the client who wants to settle.
Opponents of Sunshine legislation respond that such laws would
produce a powerful disincentive to settlement.46 A potential defendant in a
products liability suit would be less likely to settle with a plaintiff where
the defendant could not legally ensure that details of its product would
remain secret.47  Public policy favors encouraging settlement,48 and
opponents of Sunshine laws argue that the laws would undermine this
policy, overburdening the already strained judicial system with cases that
might have settled but for Sunshine laws.49 Beyond the settlement
disincentive, Professor Arthur Miller has offered a host of arguments in
favor of confidentiality in court records and secrecy in settlements.5" In a
frequently referenced article on Sunshine laws and access to the courts,51
Settlements Under Fire in 13 States, LAW. WKLY. USA, April 30, 2001.
43. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2003) (requiring a lawyer to abide by a
client's decision to settle a matter).
44. Id.
45. See Zitrin, supra note 38, at 123.
46. See Richard L. Marcus, The Discovery Confidentiality Controversy, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV.
457, 485-86 (1991) (arguing that loss of confidentiality would inhibit the exchange of
information between parties and provide incentive for plaintiffs to pursue discovery as a "fishing
expedition"); Digges, supra note 42; see also Dord, supra note 17, at 304 (setting forth the
"chilled settlements" argument offered by opponents to open settlements).
47. See Digges, supra note 42 (writing that "[w]ithout protective orders .... [some] defense
attorneys vow they'll go the distance to obtain a defense verdict").
48. See, e.g., State ex rel. Howes v. Ormond Oil & Gas Co., 128 N.C. App. 130, 136, 493
S.E.2d 793, 796 (1997) (stating that "[i]t is well-settled in North Carolina that compromises and
settlements of controversies between parties are favored by our courts").
49. See Marcus, supra note 46, at 487; Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders,
and Public Access to the Courts, 105 HARv. L. REV. 427, 467 (1991) (arguing that Sunshine laws
"impose a superfluous and inordinate work burden on courts").
50. See generally Miller, supra note 49 (offering justifications for opposing anti-secrecy
statutes and favoring existing protective order practice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(c)).
51. See Dord, supra note 17, at 301; Jack H. Friedenthal, Secrecy in Civil Litigation:
Discovery and Party Agreements, 9 J.L. & POL'Y 67, 90 (2000); Koniak, supra note 38, at 784
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Miller argues against presumed openness in courts and in favor of
settlement confidentiality, because important privacy5 2 and property
interests53 are implicated in the discovery process. Rather than enacting
new legislation to address potential dangers to the public, Miller contends
that existing protective order procedures adequately protect the public from
any potential harm.54 Particularly, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)
and its state analogues require a showing of good cause and judicial
balancing of interests before issuing protective orders. In fact, some
states have chosen to address the issue of potentially hazardous secret
settlements through court rules governing protective orders.56
Sunshine advocates recognize the privacy and proprietary interests of
parties to litigation or settlement.57 However, these privacy and property
concerns are alleviated by the limits Sunshine laws place on disclosure.
Specifically, only information related to the public health and safety is
generally subject to disclosure.58 Washington justified its version of
Sunshine in Litigation with a moderate policy explicitly balancing public
health concerns with privacy interests:
The legislature finds that public health and safety is promoted when
the public has knowledge that enables members of the public to
make informed choices about risks to their health and safety.
Therefore, the legislature declares as a matter of public policy that
the public has a right to information necessary to protect members of
the public from harm caused by alleged hazards to the public. The
legislature also recognizes that protection of trade secrets, other
n.4; Marcus, supra note 46, at 464 n.42; Zitrin, supra note 38, at 117 n.2.
52. Miller, supra note 49, at 464-67.
53. Id. at 467-74.
54. Id. at 474-77, 490-501; see also Marcus, supra note 46, at 488-505 (arguing that the
goals of anti-secrecy advocates can be met with existing judicial practices); Richard J. Vangelisti,
Proposed Amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) Concerning Protective Orders: A
Critical Analysis of What It Means and How It Operates, 48 BAYLOR L. REv. 163, 179-82
(opposing federal Sunshine in Litigation legislation but supporting an amendment to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 26(c) to address threats to public health).
55. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
56. See TEX. R. Ctv. P. 76a(1) to (2) (providing that settlement agreements "not filed of
record" that have a probable impact on general public health or safety are presumed open but may
be sealed based on judicial balancing of interests). Some states have more narrow definitions of
court records than Texas does. See, e.g., CAL. RULES OF COURT R. 243.1 (2004) (providing that
"all or a portion of any document, paper, exhibit, transcript, or other thing filed or lodged with the
court" are presumed open but may be sealed based on judicial balancing of the interests
involved).
57. See Koniak, supra note 38, at 802; Miller, supra note 41, at 375-77.
58. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(5) (West Supp. 2004) (specifically excepting from
disclosure trade secrets not pertinent to public hazards); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.611(3)
(2003) (recognizing that the public has a right to protect trade secrets and certain other
confidential information).
2004] 2163
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confidential research, development, or commercial information
concerning products or business methods promotes business activity
and prevents unfair competition. Therefore, the legislature declares
it a matter of public policy that the confidentiality of such
information be protected and its unnecessary disclosure prevented.59
By balancing the need for confidentiality with the need to protect
public health and safety, Sunshine laws seek to limit the harm disclosure
can cause to a settlement. However, Miller also argues that Sunshine and
related legislation would likely produce negative effects on the judicial
system. Responding to arguments in favor of openness based on benefits to
the legal system, Miller counters that such laws extend discovery,
encourage complete adjudication to vindicate negative publicity rather than
settlement, and create incentives to litigation by business competitors in the
hopes of gaining access to valuable commercial information.6' Further,
judicial resources, already under tremendous strain, would be made into
"information clearinghouses," 61 collecting and parceling out court records
when members of the public request access.
Others have extended Miller's general argument noting that Sunshine
laws create a significant advantage for plaintiffs' attorneys.62 Opening
discovery and settlement agreements allows the plaintiffs' bar access to
valuable information for use in pursuing additional claims against alleged
threats to public health and safety.63 Though Sunshine laws are beneficial
to the public welfare, the corporate defense bar vocally opposes such laws
because of this perceived plaintiffs' advantage. 6 Critics of the legislation
argue that the access to information allowed by broad Sunshine laws
reduces plaintiffs' attorneys' time, effort, and the cost of similar litigation
and exposes new areas of potential litigation to plaintiffs' attorneys.65 One
Sunshine opponent argues that the advantages Sunshine laws give to
59. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.601 (2003) (emphasis added). Washington's statute goes on
to declare that confidentiality provisions in court orders or private settlement agreements may
only be entered if the court finds them to be in the public interest. Id. § 4.24.61 1(4)(b). All other
confidentiality provisions are voidable. Id. § 4.24.611 (5)(a).
60. Miller, supra note 49, at 483-87.
61. Id. at 487-89. Miller analogizes Sunshine laws (with their resulting "clearinghouse"
function) to "a court-administered Freedom of Information Act." Id. at 487.
62. See Digges, supra note 42 (explaining that currently "a lot of the requests for secrecy in
settlement are [made] to allow corporations to continue to hide the information that other
plaintiffs' lawyers would like to find."); Friedenthal, supra note 51, at 96 (noting that if
confidentiality provisions were not honored, the dynamics of settlement would change in favor of
plaintiffs).
63. See Digges, supra note 42 (referring to open settlement records as "litigation kits" for
plaintiffs).
64. See id.
65. Id.
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plaintiffs' lawyers present a serious threat to "Corporate America" because
they expose trade secrets and proprietary information.66
Traditional notions of freedom of contract may also support arguments
in favor of settlement confidentiality.67 Parties are generally free "to bind
themselves as they see fit, subject . . . to the qualification that contractual
provisions violative of the law or contrary to some rule of public policy are
void and unenforceable."68 Indeed, freedom of contract is a time-honored
tradition that judges do not cursorily set aside.69  Proponents of
confidentiality might argue that secrecy about terms is merely part of the
bargain in a settlement contract.7"
Though they may disagree about the interests that Sunshine in
Litigation Acts serve or undermine, neither advocates nor opponents of
Sunshine laws can offer empirical evidence in support of their positions.
Miller argues that only isolated anecdotal evidence supports a fear of
dangerous settlements that harm public health and safety.7' Meanwhile,
James Rooks, policy research counsel at the Center for Constitutional
Litigation," argues that evidence collected thus far does not support
opponents' contentions that prohibiting secrecy would chill settlements;
rather, Rooks found, when he analyzed Florida data from 1986 to 2000,
that per capita filings for all torts declined "substantially," and the per
capita number of case dispositions also declined over the years.7 3  One
66. Id. "This type of legislation gives plaintiffs' attorneys a huge advantage against
Corporate America .... Corporate America does not want their proprietary and trade secret
information available to the public, and they will resist in every legal way they can.' " Id.
(quoting the president of the International Association of Defense Counsel). But see FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 69.081(5) (West Supp. 2004) (excepting trade secrets unrelated to public hazards from
disclosure).
67. "The principle of freedom of contract is ... rooted in the notion that it is in the public
interest to recognize that individuals have broad powers to order their own affairs by making
legally enforceable promises." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 8 introductory n.
(1981).
68. Hall v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 242 N.C. 707, 709-10, 89 S.E.2d 396, 397-98 (1955).
69. See, e.g., Kaleel Builders, Inc. v. Ashby, 161 N.C. App. 34, 41, 587 S.E.2d 470, 475
(2003) (referring to North Carolina's "long standing and coveted principle of freedom of
contract").
70. But see Koniak, supra note 38, at 788-92 (arguing that the settlement secrecy debate
should be framed not as a matter of civil procedure or ethics but as a matter of contract law
subject to contract law's principles of voidability).
71. Miller, supra note 49, at 480.
72. The Center for Constitutional Litigation represents the Association of Trial Lawyers of
America, a plaintiffs' bar organization. See ATLA in the Courts, at http://www.atla.org/
IntheCourtsflntheCourts.aspx (last visited Sept. 1, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
73. Rooks, supra note 38, at 22. The per capita number of filings went from 2.76 per 1,000
residents to 2.23 over the fourteen-year period. Id. at 22. The per capita number of dispositions
went from 3.01 per 1,000 residents to 2.16 per 1,000 residents. Id. Rooks acknowledged,
however, that "evidence will not yet support analysis with scientific rigor . I..." d  The validity
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would expect to see more claims filed if Sunshine laws had actually chilled
settlements.74 However, few cases concerning Florida's law have been
litigated, making it difficult to gauge the real impact of Sunshine acts on
litigation and the judicial system.75 Thus, the actual effect of Sunshine
statutes on settlements-either supporting the chilled settlements argument
or supporting benefits to public health and safety-is not yet clear.
In spite of the lack of empirical settlement data, other practical effects
of the statute can be deduced. Sunshine in Litigation statutes seek to
protect the public from hazards hidden in settlement agreements.76
However, the scope of the settlement agreements included in the statutes'
terms greatly influences the extent to which those statutes can actually
achieve their purposes. For example, Florida's statute expressly states
portions of settlement agreements-whether filed or not filed with the
court-that conceal public hazards are "void, contrary to public policy, and
may not be enforced. ' 77  But, Georgia's proposed legislation merely
prohibits parties from including provisions in settlement agreements that
are filed with the court or otherwise part of the court record that restrict
"disclosure of information which is relevant to the protection of public
health, welfare, or safety."78  The difference between Florida's and
Georgia's Sunshine statutes is significant. While Florida can reach private
settlement agreements that were never filed with the court, Georgia's bill
would only affect settlements that were filed with the court.
of the Rooks study may be undercut by the fact that his measurement is based on filings per
number of state residents, given Florida's population increase since 1990. The total population of
Florida grew from 12,937,926 in 1990 to 15,982,378 in 2000. See U.S. Bureau of the Census,
Table DP-1 Profile of General Demographic Characteristics for Florida: 1990,
http://www.census.gov/press-release/www/2001/tables/dp-fl.1990.pdf (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review); U.S. Bureau of the Census, DP-1 Profile of General Demographic
Characteristics for Florida: 2000, http://www.census.gov/press-release/www/2001/tablesl
dp-fl2000.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); 1990 Census of Population and
Housing; U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000, available at http://www.census.gov.
74. Rooks, supra note 38, at 22.
75. See Dord, supra note 17, at 314. "Although much controversy surrounded the initial
enactment of these sunshine reforms, there has been little subsequent appellate discussion or
empirical review of them. Assessment of their actual effect upon the judicial system itself, the
parties, or the public in general thus remains speculative at best." Id.
76. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
77. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(4) (West Supp. 2004).
78. H.B. 1019, 147th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., at 9-11-72(a) (Ga. 2003), available at
http://www.legis.state.ga.us/legis/2003_- 04/versions/hbl019 LC 29 1019_a_2.htm (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review). Specifically, Georgia's prohibition includes "settlement
agreements, consent orders, or any other dispositive document or order filed with a court or
subject to enforcement by any other document filed with the court." Id. (emphasis added). It also
includes "final disposition of a pending action .... such as a full and final settlement with a
dismissal with prejudice" conditioned on secrecy concerning potential health and safety threats.
Id. at 9-11-72(c).
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The typical procedure for court involvement in settlements once
actions are filed illustrates the limited practical effect of Georgia's bill.
Settlements generally come before a state court in one of two ways: parties
who ha-ie agreed to settle out of court may file a motion to voluntarily
dismiss a claim with prejudice,79 or parties who have already settled may
file a judgment setting forth an agreement (the details of which are at the
parties' discretion) and seeking the court's assistance in enforcement. 0 In
either case, neither law nor procedural rules requires the parties to
accompany their filings with the full terms of the settlement agreement.8'
Thus, a party who does not want a provision restricting disclosure of a
public hazard to come before the court can easily avoid such exposure in
the initial litigation-that party merely needs to follow the typical
procedure of not including a copy of the settlement with its motion or
judgment.
Private settlement may never come before the court at all if the parties
agree to terms before the plaintiff files a claim.8" The Boston Archdiocese
settlements illustrate the danger of secret, pre-litigation settlements hiding
public dangers that can become rampant by the time they are discovered.83
The Bridgestone/Firestone tire debacle also involved numerous secret
settlements reached before fatalities and injuries caused by the tires'
shredding became widely known.84 Pre-filing settlements of this general
kind served as the impetus for some legislatures to consider Sunshine
bills.8 ' Florida's Sunshine act would have effectively reached both of these
high-profile cases,86 perhaps even preventing the harms that followed. The
Florida law's ability to invalidate such settlements and prohibit the parties
from making agreements to conceal public hazards represents powerful
evidence in support of Florida's Sunshine in Litigation Act.
More than just reaching private settlements, Florida's statue seems to
allow a plaintiff who agrees to settle on condition of secrecy before filing a
79. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(l) (indicating that parties may stipulate to a dismissal with
prejudice); see also N.C. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1).
80. See Estate of Barber v. Guilford Co. Sheriffs Dept., 161 N.C. App. 658, 661-62, 589
S.E.2d 433, 435-36 (2003).
81. See id. However, a breach of contract action based on a violated settlement agreement
would likely require the full terms of a settlement agreement to come before the court. See id.
82. A court may not always be entitled to become involved in private settlements.
Alternative dispute resolution without judicial involvement is a legitimate and increasingly
favored method of resolving disputes. See Mary P. Gallagher, U.S. Civil Trials Vanishing, Says
ABA Report, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 5, 2004, at 4, available at WL 1/5/2003 TLI 4.
83. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
84. See Koniak, supra note 38, at 783-86 (discussing the settlement history of the
Bridgestone/Firestone tire cases).
85. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
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claim or after dismissal to divulge a public hazard to a government agency
and potentially face no liability for breach of contract. 87 This result is
legally possible because Florida's Sunshine law allows the court to declare
void and unenforceable portions of settlement agreements concealing
public hazards while leaving the rest of the agreement intact.88 Obviously,
Georgia would not permit such a result because an unfiled settlement does
not come within its proposed statute's coverage.89
Arguably, the Florida approach raises a question of fairness-justice
may not be served if someone who agrees to settle a claim based on
specific conditions then violates those conditions. The plaintiff in any
breach of contract action could make an equitable argument that the
breaching party should not be allowed to profit from the settlement and
later breach the terms of a contract subsequently declared void;9 ° however,
any equitable remedy would be at the court's discretion.9 The Florida
statute appears to provide a potent counter to an equitable argument of this
kind because any portion of the agreement can be declared void without
canceling the entire agreement.92 Inequity may still persist because one
party did not receive the confidentiality for which it bargained. A fair
remedy under these circumstances would be for the disclosing party to lose
all or part of its compensation for having entered the agreement in bad
faith, intending to disclose. The disclosing party should then be able to
pursue a remedy for its injury from the public hazard in court. Currently,
no positive law exists that addresses what would happen to a Florida
settlement agreement concealing a public hazard that one party breaches
after having received compensation. Certainly, though, contract principles
87. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(7) (West Supp. 2004).
88. Id. § 69.081(4). However, a party seeking to prevent disclosure can, on a showing of
good cause, move the court to prevent disclosure after in camera review. See id. § 69.081(7).
89. See H.B. 1019, 147th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., at 911_72(a) (Ga. 2003), available at
http://www.legis.state.ga.us/legis/2003_04/versions/hb1019_LC_29_1019_a_2.htm (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review).
90. Thompson v. Soles, 299 N.C. 484, 487, 263 S.E.2d 599, 602 (1980) ("[Ilt offends every
principle of equity and morality to permit a party to enjoy the benefits of a transaction and at the
same time deny its terms or qualifications .... [O]ne cannot accept the benefits of a transaction
and deny accompanying burdens.").
91. See Roberts v. Madison County Realtors Ass'n, 344 N.C. 394, 399, 474 S.E.2d 783, 787
(1996) (stating that "[w]hen equitable relief is sought, courts claim the power to grant, deny,
limit, or shape that relief as a matter of discretion").
92. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. No reported cases have addressed this
issue. See supra note 75 (discussing the lack of appellate review). In Stivers v. Ford Motor
Credit Co., 777 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000), a defendant agreed to a settlement with
the plaintiff on the condition that plaintiff not testify as an expert witness. Plaintiff continued to
testify and defendant sought to have the agreement declared void under section 69.081(4) when
plaintiff sued to enforce the agreement. Id. at 1024. The court did not address the application of
section 69.081(4) because it found that the financial harm involved was not a public hazard. Id.
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such as the voidability of contracts that are contrary to the public interest93
and the Sunshine statute's policy foundation-protection of the public-
present an obstacle to an equitable argument by the party that created the
public hazard.94
As the potential equity issues with Florida's law illustrate,
determining the reach of Sunshine in Litigation Acts is a policy decision.
A state seeking to pass a statute to limit confidential settlement terms that
endanger public health and safety must make a policy choice: will the state
seek to govern private, out-of-court agreements or only documents filed in
court? If states decide to use the judiciary's power to address public
dangers manifested in cases such as the Catholic sexual abuse scandals,
states should model their legislation on Florida's rather than Georgia's Act.
Another reason for modeling Sunshine Litigation after Florida's Act is
its treatment of valuable commercial information. Corporations have
legitimate concerns about their privacy and property interests in settlement
agreements.95 Settlement agreements may involve sensitive or valuable
company information, concerning new products, business practices, trade
secrets, or trademarks. A law that does not make an exception for
confidentiality of a legitimate, non-hazardous trade secret could potentially
damage a company's business. Although Georgia does not include an
exception for trademarks or trade secrets in its Sunshine law,96 Florida
expressly provides that trade secrets not related to public hazards are to be
protected.97 Florida's approach to protecting trade information thus
correctly allows protection for both public safety and for specific types of
benign but invaluable business information.
Unlike most other states, North Carolina has an existing settlement
93. Bicycle Transit Auth., Inc. v. Bell, 314 N.C. 219, 228, 333 S.E.2d 299, 305 (1985)
(stating that "generally, parties are free to contract anything as long as it is not illegal,
unconscionable, or against the public interest") (emphasis added).
94. Furthermore, a fundamental principle of equity is that one must come to equity with
"clean hands." See, e.g., Creech v. Melnik, 347 N.C. 520, 529, 495 S.E.2d 907, 913 (1998).
95. See Miller, supra note 49, at 464-74.
96. See H.B. 1019, 147th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., 91171 through 9 1173 (Ga. 2003),
available at http://www.legis.state.ga.uslegis/2003_04/versions/hb1019_LC_29_1019_a_2.htm
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
97. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(5) (West Supp. 2004). A trade secret is defined as:
[i]nformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method,
technique, or process that: (a) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential,
from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means
by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and (b) Is
the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
Id. § 688.002. Texas's protective order practice protects trade information as well because it
allows courts to balance certain interests, presumably including privacy and property, against the
interest in maintaining open court records. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a(l).
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disclosure law that affects only public officials and employees.98 Codified
as part of North Carolina's public records laws rather than as a rule of state
civil procedure relating to protective orders, North Carolina's settlement
disclosure rule covers "all settlement documents in any suit, administrative
proceeding or arbitration instituted against any agency of North Carolina
government or its subdivisions."99 These records are presumed to be open
and may only be sealed pursuant to a judicial order "concluding that (1) the
presumption of openness is overcome by an overriding interest and (2) that
such overriding interest cannot be protected by any measure short of
sealing the settlement."'
00
North Carolina's current settlement disclosure law reaches only
settlements for claims filed before courts or administrative agencies, but
not private settlement arrangements.' The statute's scope is further
limited by its application to claims against state governmental bodies or
public employees or officials.0 2  The statute does not directly address
settlements concerning potentially dangerous products or environmental
hazards created by private individuals or companies.
Over the last three years the North Carolina General Assembly has
twice considered its own version of Sunshine in Litigation, first during the
2001 legislative session and again during the 2003 session. Senate Bill
1071 introduced in 2001, attempted to address public hazards concealed in
court documents.0 3 Although the bill failed to leave the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary,"° the need for change in North Carolina's policy toward
98. Nevada and Oregon, however, have rules very similar to North Carolina's. Nevada bars
any settlement with state government, employees, or legislators that requires confidentiality in
any terms, declaring any such agreement void. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.0375 (Michie
2003). In Oregon, a settlement agreement with a "public body, or officer, employee or agent of a
public body" cannot be conditioned on confidentiality. OR. REV. STAT. § 30.402(1) (1997).
99. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-1.3(a) (2003).
100. Id. § 132-1.3(b). Settlement documents include "all documents which reflect, or which
are made or utilized in connection with, the terms and conditions upon which any proceedings
described in this section are comprised, settled, terminated or dismissed, including but not limited
to correspondence, settlement agreements, consent orders, checks, and bank drafts." Id. § 132-
1.3(c).
101. See text accompanying note 99.
102. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-1.3(a) (2003). The statute defines an agency of North Carolina
or its subdivisions as "every public office, public officer or official (State or local, elected or
appointed), institution, board, commission, bureau, council, department, authority or other unit of
government of the State or of any county, unit, special district or other political subdivision of
government." Id. § 132-1(a).
103. S. 1071, Gen. Assem., 2001 Sess., § 7C-4 (N.C. 2001) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review).
104. See id., available at http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/gascripts/BillLookUp/BillLookUp.pl?
Session=2001&BilIID=sl071 (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). As of March 2,
2004, Senate Bill 1071 had not been reintroduced in the 2003-2004 General Assembly session.
See id. The House of Representatives and Senate have introduced identical bills related
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potentially dangerous settlement agreements makes its terms worth
considering. Given the increasing public distrust of private industry
because of recent and highly visible mismanagement, frauds, and scandals,
the electorate and, by extension, their representatives may be more
amenable to legislation that sheds light on possible corporate
misconduct. °5
The 2001 bill contained elements of the approaches already discussed,
and mirrored Florida's legislation in some ways. The bill was premised on
findings that the public often has an interest in private litigation
settlements. 10 6  Like other Sunshine laws, Senate Bill 1071 prohibited
protective orders for documents that could pose threats to public health or
safety. 1 7 Like Florida's Sunshine law, the bill specifically exempted trade
secrets that posed no threat to public safety from potential disclosure.0 8
Senate Bill 1071 also added some features not present in other states'
Sunshine laws. In civil actions involving "personal injury, wrongful death,
monetary or property damages caused by a defective product, an
environment hazard, or a financial fraud," courts would not be allowed to
issue protective orders that would "keep from public disclosure information
that provides evidence of a threat to public health or safety" unless a final
protective order had been issued."° The final protective order procedure in
the proposed 2001 legislation provided that a court could notify the state
attorney general if the judge entered a protective order (at her discretion)
but found evidence of "a threat to public health or safety."'" 0 Thus, Senate
Bill 1071 would allow a judge to issue a protective order even though she
perceived some potential threat to public safety. The judge would have two
levels of discretion-first, in determining whether or not to issue a
protective order and, second, in deciding whether to alert the attorney
general."'
What is less clear about Senate Bill 1071 is the wisdom of its scope.
The bill defined applicable documents as "materials produced, generated,
specifically to medical malpractice settlements. See infra notes 116-26 and accompanying text.
105. See Rooks, supra note 38, at 20 (quoting South Carolina Supreme Chief Justice Joseph
Anderson, Jr.'s statements about lack of public confidence in institutions); see also Bradley K.
Googins, Time for Companies to Invest in Good Citizenship, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 25, 2002, at
E4.
106. N.C. S. 1071 § 7C-2; cf. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.601 (2003) (declaring the public right
to know information that may affect public health and safety).
107. N.C. S. 1071 § 7C-4; cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(3) (West Supp. 2004).
108. N.C. S. 1071 § 7C-6; cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(5) (West Supp. 2004).
109. N.C. S. 1071 § 7C-4.
110. Id.§7C-5(a).
111. Id. The bill expressly did not limit the court's discretion to prohibit enforcement of
confidentiality agreements "in any other cases," presumably those not involving threats to public
health or personal injury or other applicable causes of action. See id. § 7C-5(d).
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or obtained in the course of litigation in any court,"'12 but specifically
excluded "settlement documents.""' Although the bill failed to define
what "settlement document" meant, intuitively it must at least have
included the written terms of a settlement agreement produced during
litigation. Rather, the bill appears to have primarily addressed discovery
material." 4 The benefit of this kind of provision is that it would allow the
public and other interested non-parties access to court records obtained in
discovery that related to public health threats-arguably the richest source
of information about potentially dangerous products, procedures, or
processes. The threat of public access to potentially damaging discovery
would likely serve as an added incentive for defendants to settle.
However, the legislature undermined its stated concerns by failing to
include a provision making unenforceable settlement agreements
contingent on keeping threats to public health and safety secret. The bill
drafters found:
Matters of interest to the public health, safety, and welfare are often
the subject of private litigation in which representatives of the
general public do not participate and which frequently are settled or
resolved under circumstances in which matters of the greatest
concern to the public interest are kept confidential from disclosure to
the representatives of the public by agreement of the private
litigants.1 5
By leaving settlement agreements completely out of the statutory scheme,
the bill cannot have any effect on secret settlements reached before any
civil action commences. The threat of non-enforcement of such settlements
would provide a powerful disincentive to settlements that conceal public
hazards. With a bill of this kind, North Carolina would create a great
incentive to settle-certainly a boon to judicial economy but at too great a
cost. As the Catholic priest sexual abuse settlements and
Bridgestone/Firestone settlements illustrate, secret settlements can and
have exposed the public to serious health and safety dangers, sometimes
with fatal consequences. Public policy would not be served if the
legislature struck the balance in favor of judicial economy over public
health. Like Florida, North Carolina should include in its statutory scheme
settlement agreements that conceal public hazards.
For now, the General Assembly seems to have postponed or
112. Id. §7C-3(1)
113. Id. § 7C-3(l)(a).
114. See id. § 7C-3(1)(b) (including "any and all materials produced, generated, or obtained
in discovery" whether filed with the court or held by the parties' attorneys, but excluding
discovery documents not offered at trial).
115. N.C.S. 1071 §7C-2.
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abandoned changing the state's policy on secret settlements. In April 2003,
both chambers of the North Carolina General Assembly introduced
Sunshine-like bills specifically designed to prohibit confidential settlements
in medical malpractice actions.116 Senate Bill 879 and House Bill 1148,
which are identical, propose the following provision to the North Carolina
General Statutes: "In a medical malpractice action, any agreement to settle
claims against any party on a confidential basis is void and
unenforceable."" 7 Among the bill's findings is the following: "Health
care providers can now settle medical malpractice lawsuits on a
confidential basis, and injured patients have no leverage to insist that
settlements be open so as to advise the public of continuing public safety
risk from practices and procedures at facilities or from repeat malpractice
offenders.""' 8 The 2003 bills are both narrower and broader than the
Senate's 2001 bill. The 2003 bills have considerably limited the scope of
public hazards to address only medical malpractice rather than public
health and safety generally." 9 However, the 2003 bills are broader in
enforcement because any confidential settlement agreement for medical
malpractice can be declared void. 2 °
Though North Carolina has not yet enacted laws affecting confidential
settlements that conceal public dangers, it appears to have recognized the
importance of making agreements that undermine stated public policy goals
unenforceable.' 2 ' Clearly, the 2003 bills, if passed, would affect private
agreements reached before plaintiffs file claims because all confidential
malpractice settlements are declared void. 22 In their ability to reach pre-
litigation agreements, the 2003 proposals represent an improvement over
the 2001 bill. However, the latest bills are an incomplete solution.
Negligent medical care certainly qualifies as a danger to the public, but the
proposed statute completely ignores other legitimate public hazards. Public
health threats from prescription drugs, 123 defective products, 24  and
116. See S. 879, Gen. Assem., 2003 Sess. (N.C. 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review); H.R. 1148, Gen. Assem., 2003 Sess. (N.C. 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review). The Senate bill was referred to the Senate Select Committee on Insurance and Civil
Justice Reform. See N.C. S. 879, at http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/gascripts/BillLookUp/
BillLookUp.pl?Session=2003&BilllD=s879 (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). The
House bill was sent to the Committee on the Judiciary II. See N.C. H.R. 1148, at
http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/gascripts/BillLookUp/BilltookUp.pl?Session=2003&BillID=hl 148
(last visited Sept. 1, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
117. N.C. S. 879 § 2; N.C. H.R. 1148 § 2.
118. Id. § 1(2) (emphasis added).
119. N.C. S. 1071 §§ 7C-3(5), 7C-4.
120. N.C. S. 879 § 2; N.C. H.R. 114 § 2.
121. See id.
122. Id.
123. See Zitrin, supra note 38, at 119 (describing the dangers of the drug Zomax).
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clergy,125 among others, would all be unaffected by the medical malpractice
bills. In fact, the 2003 bills are not true Sunshine laws because they focus
so narrowly on one particular kind of public hazard rather than a broad
class of health and safety risks.126 Though enacting the 2003 bills would
represent a positive step for Sunshine legislation in North Carolina, the
impact of the law on public health and safety would be restricted.
If North Carolina is committed to protecting the public from
dangerous, even life-threatening products or conditions hidden in
settlement agreements, it must follow Florida's example by enacting a
statute strongly protective of public health, safety, and welfare. Statutes
that fail to bring private, unfiled settlement agreements under their rubric
cannot adequately address the grave dangers these agreements sometimes
conceal. One need only consider the example of Father John Geoghan.. 7 to
understand the devastating consequences of secrecy about public hazards.
North Carolina, then, should pass a Sunshine law that declares any
agreement that contains a condition of confidentiality regarding a public
hazard void as a matter of public policy. Further, North Carolina, like
Florida, should define "public hazard" so that at the very least the term
includes a "device, instrument, person, procedure, [or] product."'28 To
ensure that businesses receive some protection, North Carolina should
exempt from disclosure trademarks, trade secrets, or other commercial
information that is not relevant to the public hazard.
Sunshine in Litigation Acts and confidential settlement laws assume
varied forms in the many states that have adopted them.'29 While Florida's
Sunshine law was enacted fourteen years ago, 30 the trend toward
addressing concealed public hazards in litigation-related documents has not
abated. As North Carolina and other states continue or begin
contemplating Sunshine in Litigation Acts, they must consider the
existence of settlements conditioned on secrecy that never become part of
the court record and the scope of public dangers their laws seek to prevent.
Unless legislatures affirmatively act to bring out-of-court settlements under
the authority of Sunshine laws, these settlements can effectively undermine
124. See Koniak, supra note 38, at 783-86 (describing the dangers of Firestone tires).
125. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text (discussing the Catholic priest sexual abuse
crisis).
126. Florida, for example, defines "public hazard" broadly. See supra notes 18-24 and
accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
128. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(2) (West Supp. 2004). The Catholic abuse incidents illustrate
the importance of including people within the definition. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying
text.
129. See supra note 13.
130. 1990 Fla. Laws ch. 90-20, § 1 (effective July 1, 1990).
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the very purpose of Sunshine acts-protecting the public from hidden
dangers to health and safety. Laws that void the parts of settlement
agreements that conceal public hazards represent an effective method for
promoting the laws' prophylactic goals; the authority to render void
agreements that compromise the public welfare allows the exposure of
hidden dangers in pre-litigation agreements. Alternatively, statutes that do
not confer the power to void settlement agreements concealing public
hazards effectively permit some of the most dangerous settlements to
escape the cleansing light13' of Sunshine laws. So long as parties are free to
condition settlement on keeping dangers to public health secret, Sunshine
in Litigation Acts cannot achieve their full protective potential.
ELIZABETH E. SPAINHOUR
131. "As Mr. Justice Brandeis correctly observed, 'sunlight is the most powerful of all
disinfectants.' " N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 305 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring)
(citing FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 61 (1949)).
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